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THE ART OF CONDUCT, THE CONDUCT OF ART AND THE 'MIXED 
SCIBNCE' OF ELIOT'S ETHICS: 'SYMPATHETIC IMPULSE' AND 'THE 
SCIBNTIFIC POINT OF VIBW' IN THE MILL ON THE FWSS 
By Simon Calder 
The Mill on the Floss is full of keys and clues. Most famously, Maggie Tolliver, following her 
father's bankruptcy, 'wanted some key that would enable her to understand and, in 
understanding, endure, the heavy weight that had fallen on her young heart.' 1 In chapter three 
of Book Four of Eliot's novel, Maggie believes herself to have found just such a key in Thomas 
a Kempis's The Imitation of Christ (MF, 298): 
Here, then, was a secret of life that would enable her to renounce all other 
secrets ... [F]or the first time she saw the possibility of shifting the position 
from which she looked at the gratification of her own desires, of taking her 
stand out of herself, and looking at her own life as an insignificant part of a 
divinely guided whole. (302) 
George Eliot was, of course, highly suspicious of the endeavour to discover master keys:2 
opposed to Casaubon's search for the Key to all Mythologies, she could hardly have wholly 
supported Maggie's belief in a Kempisian key to existence. In the final chapter of Book Six 
however, it becomes clear that Maggie has discovered something in Kempis. What she has 
actually found, suggests Eliot's narrator, is not a key but a 'clue'. In the following quotation 
from 'Waking', we find Maggie engaged in a process of discovery: 'soon the whole terrible 
truth urged itself upon her' (491). Maggie is shown to be coming to know that to rend such 
'ties' as give 'meaning' to 'duty' is irrevocably 'wrong'; 
Her life with Stephen could have no sacredness: she must for ever sink and 
wander vaguely, driven by uncertain impulse;for she had let go the clue of life 
- that clue which once in the far off years her young need had clutched so 
strongly. (491; my italics) 
I want to suggest that Eliot's account of Maggie's development itself includes some crucial 
clues to her own ideas about the symbiotic relation between ethics (the art of conduct), 
aesthetics (the conduct of art) and epistemology (the art or science of coming to know). In The 
Mill on the Floss, Maggie's initial response to The Imitation of Christ is not entirely separable 
from her later discovery that she is just one 'part' of a more complex 'whole', which includes 
both Philip and Lucy. In turn, Maggie's aesthetic response to Kempis and her epistemological 
discovery (of the 'terrible truth') are deeply related to her ethical decision, to return home. My 
reason for applying these philosophical terms to Eliot's fiction is to highlight how different her 
perspective is from those of some of the figures with whom she is regularly associated. As 
Martha Vogeler highlighted in a Special 'George Eliot' Issue of Nineteenth Century Fiction 
published in 1980, positivists like Frederic Harrison staunchly believed that ethics, aesthetics 
and epistemology ought first to be clearly separated, before being set back together again: 
Just as Positivist philosophy established the [epistemologically] True, and 
Positive polity defined the [ethically] Good, so Positivist art should present the 
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[aesthetically] Beautiful.3 
When, to quote Bernard Paris, '[George Eliot] wrote to Frederic Harrison of having "gone 
through again the severe effort of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as if they 
had revealed themselves to me first in the flesh and not in the spirit"' ,4 she was blurring the 
boundaries between thought, right action and creativity in much the same manner as she does 
in The Mill on the Floss. Paris's compelling account of 'Eliot's use of the novel as an 
instrument of moral education' does not seem sufficiently alive to the significance of this 
blurring, however (Paris, 121). Paris's central idea - in Experiments in Life - was that Eliot saw 
'the vivid representation of human experience as a far more effective means of moral education 
than theories, sermons and tracts' (124). According to this theory, Eliot only appears to 
reconcile Realism (epistemology) and Moralism (ethics) because she had a more 'vivid' 
aesthetic than the 'other positivists' (242-250, 3). Paris assumes that Eliot had the same 
purpose as Harrison and Comte, and that she therefore aimed to motivate ethical action 
realistically (i.e., in a deterministic world), by initiating certain, philosopltj.cally-endorsed 
moral 'causes'. The Mill on the Floss provides many interesting clues as to how Eliot's position 
is far more complex than Paris's account of it suggests .. · 
'"· Before suggesting how Eliot's novel troubles some of the notions about moral development 
with which her fiction is often associated, I want to draw attention to a notebook that Eliot 
composed in the late 1870s. This notebook - which opens with epigrams from both Aristotle 
and Mill and contains an entry on 'Moral Freedom' - is the closest thing that we have to a Key 
to Eliot's philosophical attitude. Here is what Eliot writes about 'right action': 
A great deal of 'right action' is sure to be done - as sure as the begetting of 
children - if human society continues; & to be done for sympathetic impulses. 
Why have multitudes of mankind been tender to their mothers, waited on the 
sick ... - & so on? Not because they were contemplating the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number of mankind - or their own achievement of utmost 
possible excellence - or their own happiness here or hereafter. 5 
Rather than provoking the question 'what, then, were these people contemplating?', Eliot's 
passage implies that there is no sure connection between contemplation (i.e., theory or 
philosophy) and ethical activity. Eliot suggests that the kinds of 'right action' that concern her 
could not have been motivated by utilitarian calculations about 'the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number', by positivistic aspirations after the 'utmost positive excellence', by 
eudaemonistic ideas about achieving 'happiness here' or by theological theories about 
achieving it 'hereafter'. Eliot suggests that 'right action' depends not upon 'contemplation' but 
upon 'sympathetic impulses'. 
It may come as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, that in the paragraph directly pre.ceding that 
on 'sympathetic impulses', Eliot encourages us to 'consider ethics' from a 'scientific point of 
view'. This is how she opens the first original entry in her notebook: 
Ethics is a mixed science to which conduct is the corresponding art. From the 
scientific point of view you have to consider the forms of force or energy 
concerned & how they are generated & what changes they will beget directly 
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& incidentally. Hence it seems an unfruitful attempt now to consider ethics 
apart from social & psychological evolution. ('ML', 364) 
Should we theorize or shouldn't we? The first two paragraphs of Eliot's notebook appear to 
present conflicting views: whereas the first suggests that we ought to think about ethics from 
a 'scientific point of view', the second suggests that 'right action' only evolves from 
'sympathetic impulses' (so the less we theorize the better, surely?). This conflict between 
sympathetic impulse and the scientific point of view is, I think, also embodied in Eliot's well-
known declaration that her novels are 'experiments in life'. 
This is how Eliot theorized her own artistic conduct to Dr Joseph Frank Payne in a letter 
composed on 25 January 1876: 
My writing is simply a set of experiments in life - an endeavour to see what 
our thought and emotion may be capable of - what stores of motive, actual or 
hinted as possible, give promise of a better after which we may strive - what 
gains from past revelations and discipline we must strive to keep hold of as 
something more sure than shifting theory.6 
Contra Eliot, there is nothing simple about this statement, which - like her writing on Ethics -
seems to point in two separate directions. Eliot claims that her writings are 'experiments': this 
draws attention to the continuity between her own work and that of Auguste Comte and John 
Stuart Mill,7 both of whom prescribed rules for experimental conduct, in the Cours de 
philosophie positive (1830-42) and A System of Logic (1843) respectively. Some salient aspects 
of Eliot's account point in a decidedly different direction however, very much away from 
Comte and Mill: whereas these philosophers were each essentially concerned with creating a 
scientific 'Organon of Discovery' ,8 Eliot concludes her sentence by suggesting that 'we must 
strive to keep hold of ["stores of motive"] as something more sure than shifting theory.' Eliot's 
reflections on her own creative conduct then continue in this vein: 
I become more and more timid - with less daring to adopt any formula that 
does not get itself clothed for me in some human figure and individual 
experience, and perhaps that is a sign that if I help others to see at all it must 
be through the medium of art. (GEL VI, 216-217) 
Once again, this statement betrays a blurring of philosophical boundaries to which I think 
Paris's theorization ofEliot's 'experiments' is insufficiently alive: Eliot does not perceive 'Art' 
a la Comte and Harrison, as a means of inculcating motives that Positivist polity has deemed 
Good because Positivist philosophy declares it to be True that they lead to right action. 
Although I hope to highlight some previously unrecognized ways in which The Mill on the 
Floss engages with Comte and Mill, I believe that Paris was unwise to assume that the motives 
that governed Eliot's conduct as a moralist and the results that she hoped to elicit as an artist 
were fundamentally similar to the motives that inspired and the results that were sought by 
these philosophers. 
I have suggested that a conflict between 'sympathetic impulse' and 'the scientific point of 
view' exists at the heart ofEliot's art, and that this same conflict is embodied in her theoretical 
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reflections both on ethics and her own artistic conduct. The third paragraph of Eliot's notebook 
on ethical subjects, subtitled 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge', contains a clue as to how this 
conflict might be controlled: 
What seems eminently wanted is a closer comparison between the knowledge 
which we call rational & the experience which we call emotional. ('ML', 364) 
If 'Feeling is a sort of Knowledge', then the kind of (aesthetic) experience that one acquires 
through art may inculcate not just (ethical) action but also a different 'sort of Knowledge' than 
that which scientists and philosophers may acquire by Comtean or Millean means. Consider 
again Maggie Tulliver, whose ultimate recognition of the 'truth' about 'this hard, real life', in 
Book Six of The Mill on the Floss, is traceable to a 'sudden vision' in Book Four (MF, 491, 
298,302). Although there is nothing analogous to this notion of gaining 'from past revelations' 
in Comte or Mill's writings on knowledge-acquisition, there is a remarkable affinity between 
Eliot's (feeling-saturated) thought and that of the modern moral philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum. I here quote the passage from Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature that I believe to be most pertinent to our effort to appreciate Eliot's thought on the 
conduct of art and art of conduct: 
[O]ne of the things that makes literature something deeper and more central 
than a complex game ... [is that it] speaks about us, about our lives and choices 
and emotions, about our social existence and the totality of our connections. As 
Aristotle observed, it is deep, and conducive to our inquiry about how to live, 
because it. .. searches for patterns of possibility - of choice, and circumstance, 
and the interaction between choice and circumstance - that tum up in human 
lives with such persistence that they must be regarded as our possibilities. And 
so our interest in literature becomes ... cognitive: an interest in finding out... 
what possibilities (and tragic impossibilities) life offers to us, what hopes and 
fears for ourselves it underwrites or subverts.9 
Like Eliot, Nussbaum believes that literature can conduct important epistemic work in a sphere 
within which traditional philosophic and scientific practices cannot elicit adequate findings, a 
sphere in which the object of interest is 'life' and the 'possibilities' it offers us. As Suzy Anger 
observes in The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, 'George Eliot made similar claims' to 
Martha Nussbaum, to the effect that 'some ethical truths are presentable oply in the form of 
narrative, which can illustrate the complexities, particularities, and nuances of life, in ways 
which abstract philosophical treatments of ethics are incapable of doing' .10 Important avenues 
remain to be explored between Eliot and Nussbaum's thought, the chief of which concerns an 
affinity between Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian picture of 'choice' - 'as an ability that lies on 
the borderline between the intellectual and the passional' - and Eliot's call for 'closer 
comparison between the knowledge which we call rational & the experience which we call 
emotional' (LK, 78; 'ML', 364). 
However, if Nussbaum contributes something towards our appreciation of Eliot then it is not a 
key but a clue. Indeed, there are various reasons why Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian theory of 
the conduct of art fails to fit with the texture of Eliot's experimental fiction, as Nussbaum 
herself was the first to highlight when she dismissed George Eliot's novels as '[in]appropriate' 
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objects of interest in her Introduction to Love's Knowledge (45). Nussbaum's work ultimately 
shows (to appropriate her own assessment of Eliot) that the 'posture of George Eliot's narrator' 
projects a very different picture of 'our human position' (indeed, a more 'scientific' one) than 
that which any self-defining neo-Aristotelian is likely to welcome (45). From the perspective 
of eudaemonist theorists (who essentially believe that 'contemplating ... [our] happiness here', 
however broadly one interprets this, is the Key to increasing 'right action'), Eliot's fiction is 
likely to cause more trouble than it's worth. Nussbaum does afford us a clue though, that 'our 
interest in literature' may be 'cognitive'; recognizing how this supports Nussbaum's general 
claim that 'style' is 'an integral part ... of the search for and the statement of truth', I want to 
suggest that Eliot's fiction directs us towards a different sort of knowledge than conventional 
philosophical and scientific methods are able to elicit (LK, 3). With this anticipative idea in 
mind, let's return to The Mill on the Floss and see where it gets us. 
Like his sister Maggie, Tom Tulliver engages in a number of attempts to understand and, in 
understanding, endure this hard, real life. Although 'life had not presented itself to him as a 
difficult problem' at Mr Jacobs's Academy, after a fortnight at King's Lorton it seemed 'that 
life, complicated not only with the Latin grammar but with a new standard of English 
pronunciation, was a very difficult business' (MF, 140-141). As Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has 
noted, the 'only time [that] Tom begins to develop a sense of alternatives, and hence of the 
questionable value of his customary ways and familial "rights", is at Stelling's school, where 
the different "standard of things" domestic and personal acts like a difference of native 
language, casting his whole moral vocabulary into question' (Ermarth, 82). Focusing on 'Tom's 
"First Half", I want to consider the significance of the fact that, though both Tom and Maggie 
are bewildered by Stelling, Eliot makes no suggestion that these children could or should be 
converted from a bad track to a better one by means of systematic education. 
Both Comte and Mill had some highly developed ideas about the proper nature and telos of 
education, conceptions that were alien to those that I hope to unearth from Eliot's fiction. 
Throughout the remainder of this article, I shall relate some salient features of Eliot's account 
of Tom and Maggie's schooling to Comte and Mill's theories of education, not because I think 
that Eliot adopted their theories, but for the Nussbaumian reason that we 'grasp by contrasting' 
(LK, 190). However, whereas Nussbaum believes that we may 'grasp' the fact 'that all novels 
share certain [neo-Aristotelian] ethical commitments' through contrasting novels with works of 
philosophy, I suggest that the picture of life that emerges from Eliot's fiction contrasts both 
with Nussbaum's neo-Aristotelian conception and with the pictures of life conveyed by Comte 
and Mill (190). 
One of the strongest pieces of evidence that Eliot continued to engage with Comtean theory 
throughout her fiction-writing career is her celebration, in the aforementioned notebook, of 
Comte's Key distinction 'between the Static & Dynamic - between what is an inherent quality 
or characteristic or need of the human being (i.e. the social man who is alone really human), & 
what is modifiable or doomed to disappear under successive changes' ('ML', 372). Comte 
believed that by methodical experimentation certain 'static' qualities of the human mind might 
become known, and that a positivistic education system might thus be deduced from this data. 
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Indeed, in the Cours de philosophie positive Comte asserted that the 'establishment' of a final, 
positivistic stage of human development would necessitate a 'general recasting' of the 
European 'educational system': 11 
Competent judges are already unanimous in recognizing the necessity of replacing 
our European education, which is still essentially theological, metaphysical, and 
literary, by a positive education in accordance with the spirit of our time and adapted 
to the needs of modem civilization. (Comte, 24) 
There is clearly a considerable clash between Comte's mono-linear explanation of the way in 
which all human minds develop, through three successive stages - theological, metaphysical 
and positivistic - and Eliot's depiction of Maggie's move away from both fiction (contra Philip) 
and 'masculine wisdom' (contra Mr Stelling and Tom) to Thomas a Kempis's theological 
perspective (or to the Feuerbachian humanism towards which Eliot's presentation ofMaggie's 
development points). What is the significance of this radical discrepancy between Comte's 
sense of ideal human development and Eliot's presentation of Maggie's actual progress? 
When Maggie visits King's Lorton and first encounters the Latin language, she does not 
attempt to discover the meaning of phrases inductively, but skips to an 'English Key' at the end 
of the Grammar book. (155). From a Comtean perspective, Maggie's yearning for Keys (first, 
this Key to the Grammar Book, and later that Kempisian master key) reveal her essential 
inaptitude for a properly positivistic education: she is too often distracted by 'absorbing' 
particulars to develop her understanding of the lawful relations between such details. Maggie -
so it seems - never acquires understanding, since she 'skip[s] the rules in the Syntax' (155). 
The full force ofMaggie's alleged error, as seen from the perspective of a positivistic educator-
theorist, can only be fully appreciated in light of Comte's elaborately hierarchical model of the 
system of positive sciences. To briefly characterize that system, Comte held that every positive 
science ought to occupy a given place within a scale ascending from astronomy (which 
'considers the most general, simple, and abstract phenomena') to sociology (which considers 
'the most special, complicated, and concrete') (Comte, 57). Although Comte recognized that 
the objects studied by mathematicians and astronomers (i.e., at the 'abstract' end of the 
spectrum) appear to be 'remote from human interests', he held that such laws as may be 
discovered through studying 'abstract' phenomena must inevitably also determine the concrete 
phenomena studied in the complex (and more immediately interesting) sciences (57). As such, 
it is only by first recognizing abstract truths about simple laws that positivistic inquirers may 
later proceed to acquire positive knowledge about •concrete' objects: this theory would suggest 
that through failing to master something so admittedly abstract as the laws of Latin Syntax, 
Maggie excludes herself from understanding all that is nearest and dearest to her (here, her 
brother, Mr Stelling, and the words on the page). 
Interestingly, despite her own assertion that Eliot had limited interest in positivism,12 Elizabeth 
Deeds Ermarth lays just this kind of charge upon both of the Tulliver children: 
Neither Tom nor Maggie learns enough about the syntax of things, or about the 
difference between one syntax and another, to overcome their earliest lessons 
about exclusiveness, obedience, and passivity. (Ermarth, 82) 
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I want to suggest that a readership conversant with Comte's hierarchical structure of the 
sciences would have been alive to the fact that the clash between Maggie 's mode of living and 
that of the implied ideal learner works in two directions. Eliot's narrative does not invite us to 
be one-sidedly critical of Maggie's particularism. Indeed, the narrator too draws our attention 
towards an example that both Maggie and I find particularly interesting: 
The astronomer who hated women generally caused her so much puzzling 
speculation that she one day asked Mr Stelling if all astronomers hated women, 
or whether it was only this particular astronomer. But forestalling his answer, 
she said, 'I suppose it's all astronomers: because you know, they live up in high 
towers, and if the women came there, they might talk and hinder them from 
looking at the stars.' (MF, 158) 
Maggie may skip the rules in the Syntax; nevertheless, she directly intuits the clue (this 
misogynistic astronomer) to Eliot's critique of Comte. As much as Maggie's unsystematic 
approach to Grammar is implicitly criticized by both Eliot's narrator and Tom, Maggie's 
attitude towards the astronomer simultaneously challenges Comte's assumption that one can 
only acquire real knowledge through first becoming adept at handling abstractions. In all its 
concrete specificity, Maggie's favourite example is remarkably salient, for in Comte's 
conception the astronomer's own heuristic, of radical abstraction, is the anti-type to Maggie's 
particularism. Neither Maggie nor her astronomer escapes from Eliot's irony, however: if 
Tom's derision of Maggie emphasizes her inaptitude for 'masculine wisdom', then Maggie's 
puzzlement at the astronomer highlights his inaptitude for life, which is - after all - that which 
Eliot's fiction studies. Maggie's hypothetical astronomer prioritizes planets over people: this 
fact about his conduct (a fact elicited by both Maggie's intuition and Eliot's art) appears to belie 
his pretension to exemplarity. Insofar as Eliot's narrator presents Maggie's own way of living 
sympathetically meanwhile, then Eliot's fiction directly challenges the value-judgements on 
which Comte's positive polity was founded. In a manner that deeply troubles Paris's theory of 
Eliot's thought and fiction, The Mill on the Floss makes us question whether it is always better 
to be and to think like a positivist than to be and to think theologically or metaphysically, like 
Maggie Tulliver. 
For a number of reasons, one expects to discover a closer affinity between Eliot and Mill than 
between Eliot and Comte. First, in her essay of 1855, on 'The Future of German Philosophy', 
Eliot responds to Professor Gruppe's misapprehension of Mill's System with a forceful defence 
of his account of the relation between 'Deduction' and 'experiment': 
Deduction, Mill shows, is not properly opposed to induction but to experiment, 
and is a means of registering and using the results of induction, indispensable 
to any great progress in science.13 
Second, Mill paralleled Eliot in recognizing how Comte's refusal to accept Psychology as a 
positive science was 'the parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science' 
('ACP', 298). Eliot's 1870s notebook tellingly opens with an epigraph from 'Mill's Logic' 
concerning 'the necessity of an experimental study' of 'mental phenomena': 
The generation of one class of mental phenomena from another, whenever it 
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can be made out, is a highly interesting fact in psychological chemistry; but it 
no more supersedes the necessity of an experimental study of the generated 
phenomena, than a knowledge of the properties of oxygen & sulphur enables 
us to deduce those of sulphuric acid without specific observation & 
experiment. - Mill's Logic ii. 63714 
To interrelate Eliot's two nuggets of Millean wisdom, Deduction is indispensable to any great 
progress in science, and yet inadvisable when uninformed by specific observation and 
experiment. This is the basis on with Mill grounds his theory of education: Education, for Mill, 
is the 'art' that corresponds to the Deductive Science 'Ethology', where Ethology or 'the 
Science of Character' is 'a system of corollaries from [the Experimental Science] Psychology' 
(ASL, 869).15 Mill hoped that by studying 'the origin and sources of all those qualities in human 
beings which are interesting to us, either as facts to be produced, to be avoided, or merely to 
be understood', Ethologists might unearth ample data regarding the interplay between 
psychological and material laws and that from this data theorists might deduce a broad range 
of educatory systems, each designed to cultivate a different type of nature (ASL, 873). 
There is a third reason why one might expect Eliot's ideas to parallel Mill's, and this is that 
Mill's own aversion to illiberally imposing a prescribed educatory system upon the populace 
was based on his intuition that the public might effectively be treated as amateur Ethologists. 
Here is the famous quotation from Chapter Three of On Liberty - published five years before 
Eliot composed her letter to Dr Joseph Frank Payne - in which Mill suggests that political 
authorities ought to promote 'experiments of living': 
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different 
opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free 
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and 
that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any 
one thinks fit to try them. 16 
Are Eliot's novels Millean exercises in Ethology? Our account of Eliot's testing of both 
Maggie's and the astronomer's modes of life would certainly support this theory. Considering 
Eliot's depiction of Tom's return home from King's Lorton however, I want to suggest that 
there are considerable differences between the epistemic endeavour conducted and provoked 
by Eliot's experimental conduct and the attitude prescribed by Mill. In the following passage, 
Eliot considers Tom's affective attachment to the 'ugly' furniture of his childhood home: 
Very commonplace, very ugly, that furniture of our early home might look if it 
were put up to auction; an improved taste in upholstery scorns it; and is not the 
striving after something better in our surroundings, the grand characteristic that 
distinguishes man from the brute - or, to satisfy a scrupulous accuracy of 
definition, that distinguishes the British man from the foreign brute? (MF, 160) 
With her claim that this distinction (between 'the British man and the foreign brute') is 
scrupulously accurate, Eliot appears to ironize the 'science' of Ethology: the attempt to theorize 
about human societies is always conducted from somewhere and by someone, implicitly - in 
this case - by a 'British man', with his own scientistic and national prejudices. 'Tom's "First 
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Half" also presents a very serious challenge to Mill's moral-philosophical assumptions. 
Whereas Mill suggested that all maxim-making ought to be governed by the principle of utility 
and that useful precepts might thus be deduced from ethological laws concerning variations in 
happiness,17 Eliot recognizes that actual 'preferences' like Tom's are bound to appear 
'unjustifiable' to 'to any of those severely regulated minds who are free from the weakness of 
any attachment that does not rest on a demonstrable superiority of qualities' (MF, 160). 
I have suggested that Eliot's fiction embodies strong suspicions about the possibility, and even 
stronger suspicions about the virtue, of perching a system of ethics atop the edifice of 
scientifically-authorized knowledge. She explicitly highlights that British philosophers may 
have habitually striven 'after something better' in accordance with logical principles; 
But heaven knows where that striving might lead us if our affections had not a 
trick of twining round ... old inferior things, if the loves and sanctities of our 
life had no deep immovable roots in memory (MF, 160). 
Eliot's art ultimately challenges Mill's philosophical theory, insofar as that theory is based on 
a highly intellectualized and non-revisable conception of what man is or ought to be. Returning 
to the third chapter of On Liberty, Mill seems reluctant to question a very particular set of ideas 
about what the 'human' faculties are (or will be when fully realized): 
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather 
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities 
he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which 
he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one ( OL, 
67-68). 
According to Mill, the ideal moral agent is the man who is able to utilize adequate methods of 
investigation so as to elicit his own theory of the Good, and then live by it. This ideal agent is 
exemplary by virtue of demonstrating the following attributes or 'qualities': 'observation', 
'reasoning', 'judgment', 'activity', 'discrimination', 'firmness' and 'self-control' (67). These 
are clearly not qualities with which Tom is well-endowed when he first arrives at King's 
Lorton, and this is largely why his 'sufferings' there are so 'severe' (MF, 140). Tom is 
inobservant, insofar as he remains 'in a state of blank unimaginativeness concerning the cause 
and tendency of his sufferings', irrational and unoriginal, insofar as he doesn't engage in 
experiments in life ('not [being] given to hypothesis and experiment') and indiscriminate, 
insofar as he tries to acquire Mr. Stelling's 'approbation' at all costs (148-149). Indeed, 
Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth convincingly contrasts both Maggie's and Tom's 'passivity', their 
inability 'to control conflict, and to choose between alternatives' and their ignorance 'about the 
syntax of things', with the implied experimental author of Eliot's fiction (Ermarth, 80-88): 
Contrasting with this laziness [of those who do not deliberate and plot] is 
George Eliot's artist, pursuing a particular purpose with disciplined action. (88) 
This contrast is not unreasonable. Surely, however, part of that artist's 'purpose' is to 
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demonstrate the value of such individuals as do not endeavour to determine themselves by a 
definite conception of the Good? One such loving and reverent individual is Lucy Deane, 
whose 'nature' is explicitly said to supply her with 'no key to Tom's' in Book Six of Eliot's 
novel (MF, 475). Lucy cannot comprehend Tom's prejudiced attitude towards Philip; 
But to minds strongly marked by the positive and negative qualities that create 
severity - strength of will, conscious rectitude of purpose, narrowness of 
imagination and intellect, great power of self-control and a disposition to exert 
control over others - prejudices come as the natural food of tendencies which 
can get no sustenance out of the complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking 
knowledge which we call truth. (475-476) 
'Severity' is the closest approximation to a Key Word that 'Eliot's artist' offers in The Mill on 
the Floss. If 'Tom's sufferings' were 'quite severe' at King's Lorton, then the tables have turned 
by Book Six, wherein Tom's mind itself is marked by qualities that make severity. Along with 
these 'positive and negative qualities', Tom does appear to have acquired some marks of 
Millean exemplarity: his newfound 'strength of will', his 'conscious rectitude of purpose' and 
his 'power of self-control' overlap with the Millean originator's 'activity', 'firmness' and 'self-
control'. However, Eliot also highlights 'a disposition to exert control over others' and a 
'narrowness of imagination and intellect' as 'qualities that create severity', and she implies that 
these 'negative' qualities are often concomitant with the apparently 'positive' ones that Mill 
endorses and aspires to produce. Eliot's emphasis on these being creative qualities, where what 
is being created is 'severity', raises questions about Mill's conflation of Goodness, activity (as 
opposed to passivity) and forceful determination. Eliot's explicit suggestion is that minds 
marked by such qualities are at an epistemic disadvantage: 'prejudices come as the natural food 
of [their] tendencies'. 
It is fruitful to remember that, before Tom became quite so severe, those 'human sensibilities' 
which 'predominated' in his moral economy were incompressible to minds 'severely regulated' 
by a utilitarian impulse, the impulse to only be affected by 'attachment[s]' that 'rest on a 
demonstrable superiority of qualities' (MF, 149, 160; my italics). Eliot was far more interested 
than Mill was in non-demonstrable (or not-yet-fully-demonstrated) 'qualities' (mysterious 
'motives', hinted as possible): her experiments occasion human qualities that fail to correspond 
to any existing vocabulary, and that we should not to be too eager to subsume under moral 
categories, whether previously available or freshly formed. Crucially, Eliot seems to suggest 
that some of the qualities that theorists like Mill valued most highly (such as 'reasoning', 
'firmness' and 'self-control') are non-commensurable with those highly-esteemed 'human 
sensibilities' which The Mill on the Floss both represents through characters like Maggie and, 
ideally, cultivates in the reader. As T. R. Wright concluded, in the final sentence of the section 
of The Religion of Humanity committed to George Eliot's fiction, the 'Religion of Humanity' 
(a notion shared by both Comte and Mill) 'gained in her work the quality of humanity.' 18 
Eliot was acutely aware of the importance of questioning what manner of explanation ought to 
be given to 'unspeculative minds' like Maggie Tulliver's (MF, 304). A theological explanation 
such as Kempis' has its drawbacks: it encourages the inquirer to divert her attention away from 
the very 'outward things' that provoked her desire for 'explanation' in the first place. Eliot's 
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fiction highlights how purely scientific or philosophic explanations also have their drawbacks, 
however. Throughout this article, I have suggested that Eliot's literary 'experiments' 
investigate the extent to which an increase in the application of natural-scientific systems of 
logic to human phenomena might provoke ethical degeneration. If - as Eliot appreciated - the 
methods of investigation that Mill and Comte inaugurated were 'indispensable to any great 
progress in science', then their non-interference in the conduct of art might yet also be 
indispensable to the cultivation and preservation of 'right action' (364). 
'To regard any theory which supplants' the logic of 'life & action' 'as having supreme 
intellectual authority is a contradiction,' claimed Eliot, 'unless it could be ruled that the human 
race should commit a slow suicide by the gradual extinction of motive - the poisoning of 
feeling by inference' ('ML', 365). It is important to interrogate Eliot's use of that word, 
'motive', which she again suggests must not be poisoned in the following sentence, a sentence 
that at once unites sympathetic impulse and the scientific point of view: 
Of what use is it to consider 'ends' & the motives for seeking them, unless we 
can assure ourselves that the motives (or forms of force) in question will 
continue to be generated? (364) 
That parenthetical explication (motives are 'forms of force') provides a clue to Eliot's ethical 
perspective, a perspective wherein Tom's 'sympathetic impulse' for his home is as much a 
'motive' as the theory-induced desire to maximize happiness or the Postivistic desire to achieve 
perfection, and the former (affective) manner of motive must not be set below, explained away 
or poisoned by the latter (fully conscious) kind. Quite possibly drawing upon her knowledge 
of Spinoza's Ethics, Eliot here anticipates the moral-philosophical thought of Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, as recently expressed in a book entitled (tellingly) Experiments in Ethics: like Appiah 
(and unlike Comte, Mill, Aristotle and Nussbaum), Eliot appears to encourage oscillation 
between two very different ('but not rivalrous') perspectives, one from which 'our moral 
world' appears to be 'caused' by purely natural phenomena, and another from which it appears 
to be 'created' by and for the kinds of creature that we are. 19 'We need', Appiah claims, 'to 
explore the relationship between the perspective of the cosmic engineer and the perspective of 
the agent that she engineers; and ... we need to be able to live with both perspectives' (EIE, 
120). We need to consider ethics in relation to social and psychological evolution without 
allowing the art of conduct to become exclusively determined by the scientific point of view. 
The two perspectives that Eliot encourages us to shift between are scientific impartiality (as 
aspired towards by Comte and Mill) and anthropocentrism (as favoured by Nussbaum and 
Aristotle, but also by Feuerbach and others). George Henry Lewes was similarly alive to the 
need to honour both of these perspectives and - in The Principles of Success in Literature -
drew a fruitful distinction between the Philosopher, who attempts 'to discover and systematize 
the abstract relations of things', and the Poet, who 'wishes to kindle the emotions by the 
suggestion of objects themselves' .w Eliot's intuition that "Feeling is a sort of knowledge" 
caused her, at least as an artist, to collapse Lewes' binary distinction however, for all of her 
novels endeavour to elicit such (philosophical) knowledge about human relations as may only 
be acquired by the (artful) kindling of the emotions. 
The anthropocentric strand of Eliot's thought needs to be more fully explored, and a good place 
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to start would be through relating Eliot's suggestion that Tom's sympathetic motives 'were 
"first ideas"[,] that it was no more possible to criticize than the solidity and extension of matter' 
to Aristotle's account of 'first principles', which Eliot would later employ as an epigraph in her 
1870s notebook.21 Whereas theorists like Nussbaum fully embrace Aristotle's account of first 
principles, as preferable to a less human-centred 'Baconian' worldview,22 Eliot herself 
ultimately only rests on this Aristotelian perspective when a more scientific view might 
otherwise arrest investigation. Ultimately, for Eliot, it is possible to criticize Tom's 'first ideas' 
and (though 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge') sympathetic impulses must be questioned (since, 
like 'scientific' results, they too may be erroneous). Often, 'the scientific perspective' provokes 
Eliot to question that notion of choice, 'as an ability that lies on the borderline between the 
intellectual and the passional', that I have suggested she generally shares with Nussbaum (LK, 
78). Maggie's famous ethical 'decision' is so much a product of her earlier, aesthetic 
experience, for example, and so unconscious (or minimally intellectual) that it is debatable 
whether it is, in fact, a 'choice': 
Maggie was not conscious of a decision as she turned away from 
[Stephen's] ... gloomy averted face - and walked out of the room: it was like an 
automatic action that fulfils a forgotten intention. (500) 
* 
Suzy Anger has highlighted that Eliot noted the following 'in a late letter': '"the most thorough 
experimentalists admit intuition - i.e. direct impressions/sensibility underlying all proof - as 
necessary starting points for thought" (GEL, VI: 167)' (Anger, 85). My own hypothesis is that 
Eliot is here referring to Claude Bernard, who influenced both the Leweses and who explicitly 
asserted - in An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine - that 'Intuition or Feeling 
Begets the Experimental Idea' .23 Clearly, Bernard's sense of the 'spontaneous' and 'individual' 
nature of the inauguration of every experimental process is richer and more in line with Eliot's 
sensibility than either Comte's or Mill's theories of scientific conduct, but it is crucial to 
acknowledge the limitations of even Bernard's theory as a potential Key to Eliot's art of literary 
experimentation. Whereas Bernard held that 'no experimenter may depart' from 'the definite 
precepts and precise rules of logic' once experimentation is underway, Eliot's occasional 
anthropocentrism and her sense that 'Feeling is a sort of knowledge' seem to afford a far more 
pervasive role to the non-systematic and the emotive at every stage of the heuristic endeavour 
(ISEM, 33). That Bernard's theory only gets us so far, however, completely accords with his 
own idea that '[w]hen we propound a general theory in our sciences, we are sure only that, 
literally speaking, all such theories are false' (35). 
Neither Eliot nor Bernard confessed or promoted relativism, and both figures' emphases on the 
need for 'doubt', on the 'provisional' nature of all knowledge and on - in Bernard's words -
the 'fundamental precept' of 'non-submission to authority' were firmly grounded by their 
intuition that epistemic error is possible, indeed unavoidable, and yet partially preventable (35-
36, 41). Eliot's sense that every master Key is ultimately only a clue is inseparable from her 
sense that we are always in need of restoring our 'stores of motive', and of re-learning to know 
or really learning to feel what we know. Neither Maggie nor Marian ever ceased to see and to 
explore the possibility (possibilities and tragic impossibilities) of shifting the position from 
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which one looks at human motives. For both, it remained irrevocably wrong to let go the clue 
to life - that clue which once, in far off years, young need clutched so strongly. 
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